

30 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/SE

SUBJECT: Aggression Actions

REFERENCE: Memorandum from ADDP to All Area Division Chiefs,
Subject "Aggressive Actions", dated 25 June 1953.

I. Under the ideal circumstances described in reference the "fondest dream" of SE-1 would be the overthrow by fall of 1954 of the Hoxha regime in Albania. In outlining the actions preliminary to the actual coup d'etat we have assumed that Yugoslavia, Greece and Italy will adopt a completely cooperative attitude and that each will have agreed to keep hands off Albania unless asked for assistance. Under these conditions, our recommendations would be:

A. 1953

- (1) Immediate broadening of the NOFA to include all emigre political factions, especially the BKI and the Ali Klissura group.
- (2) Printing of sufficient lek to supply agent operations.
- (3) Immediate procurement of 5 submarines to inaugurate a complete blockade of all shipping into and out of Albania. The submarines should not be identifiable as American, would be pirate vessels operating under no flag, and would be manned by "volunteers" without papers. They would operate out of Greece and Italy. Both countries would assist in enforcing the blockade by stopping all commerce now carried on between themselves and Albania.
- (4) Recruitment and training of 1000-1500 Albanians, to be used as a striking force at the time of the coup d'etat. The striking force will enter Albania from Greece and Yugoslavia and by amphibious landings.

B. 1954

- (1) Recruitment and infiltration as soon as weather permits of American G/W experts to direct resistance activities and establish a dependable, trained nucleus around which the population would rally on signal. These experts to operate primarily in the north where there already exists a skeleton

resistance

resistance organization. They would be supplied by air-drop with food, and arms and ammunition for the revolt. Food to ensure that the resistance forces would not suffer from the economic blockade would also be dropped.

- (2) In early summer, kidnap the Albanian Ministers in both Rome and Paris; announce over the clandestine radio, by leaflet and in the NCEA newspaper that they have defected, and otherwise exploit for P/W.
- (3) A stepped-up P/W program with leaflets and radio broadcasts to take an increasingly inflammatory line as the day of revolt approaches. For at least two months prior to the coup d'etat leaflets to be dropped at weekly intervals.
- (4) Infiltrate into Albania by the most secure possible means a high-level American agent with authority to contact Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu and offer up to \$500,000 and future safety for their defection in place. The defection to include issuance of orders to Army and Sigurimi to lay down their arms at the appropriate moment.
- (5) Broadcasts to be made by all emigre leaders urging their followers to join the resistance movement. The members of the Military Junta to be dropped into Albania to lead the insurrection on the appointed day.
- (6) By August 1954, simultaneous action by the resistance forces and the striking force, ending in the successful overthrow of the Communist regime and the establishment of an acceptable interim government under U.N. auspices.
- (7) During this revolutionary action the trained force of some 4000 Albanians claimed to exist in Yugoslavia, and units of the Yugoslav and Greek armies would stand by to assist if called upon. Both the Yugoslav and Greek forces would retire beyond the Albanian frontiers immediately upon the successful conclusion of the revolution.
- (8) The American Sixth Fleet would engage in maneuvers in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas during the revolution to cover the amphibious landings and to assist the revolutionaries in the name of the U.N. if called upon to do so. It would not take an active role unless called on. The fleet would remain in the area for some weeks to discourage any retaliatory action by the Soviet Union or any of its satellites.
- (9) The free election of a democratic government.

II. While

- II. While many of the individual recommendations contained in paragraphs I-A and I-B are not essential to the successful overthrow of the Albanian Government, the benevolent neutrality, if not the active cooperation of the Yugoslav, Greek and Italian Governments assumed in paragraph I, would be required.

[Chief, SE-1]

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